

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 ABU DHABI 2039

DEPARTMENT PASS AID/W

DEPT PASS ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT AGENCY/W

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, TC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING - FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT - UAE

REF: STATE 16790, 168320 AND 183938; USCINCEUR//ECJ4/7-SA
11196 AND 11538

1. SUMMARY: PER STATE REFTELS, FOLLOWING IS THIS EMBASSY'S
FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FOR UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE, STABILITY,
UNITY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF UAE IS IMPORTANT TO
US POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN STRATEGIC OIL-RICH
PERSIAN GULF REGION. NO IMMEDIATE EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT
TO UAE EXISTS BUT UAE LEADERSHIP SEEKS AN EFFICIENT MODERN
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT TO DETER TERRITORIAL ENCROACHMENT BY
LARGER REGIONAL NEIGHBORS, PRESERVE INTERNAL SECURITY AND
NATIONAL UNITY, AND ASSIST IN MEETING REGIONAL PEACE-
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KEEPING OBLIGATIONS. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO UAE IS
CONFINED TO FMS CASH SALES OF TRAINING AND OF MODEST QUAN-
TITY OF MATERIAL, MOSTLY NON-LETHAL. MOST TRAINING AND
MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS ARE MET THROUGH PURCHASE FROM WEST
EUROPEAN AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. AS UAE IS A
CAPITAL-SURPLUS OIL EXPORTING COUNTRY, IT IS ABLE TO MAIN-
TAIN PRESENT LEVEL OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES WITHOUT ADVERSE

AFFECT ON ITS ABILITY TO FUND BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE OR TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SOCIAL SERVICES TO ITS PEOPLE. UAE HAS NOT BEEN A FOCUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN. US SALES OF TRAINING AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED TO UAE WOULD NOT AFFECT REGIONAL ARMS BALANCE. END SUMMARY.

2. U.S. INTERESTS. US HAS AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE INDEPENDENCE, INTERNAL STABILITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND FEDERAL UNITY OF UAE. WERE UAE TO BE INVADED BY A NEIGHBOR, TAKEN OVER BY RADICAL ELEMENTS, OR FALL APART BECAUSE OF DISSENSION AMONG ITS SEVEN CONSTITUENT EMIRATES, CONSEQUENCE WOULD BE INCREASED TENSION, EVEN POSSIBLE CONFLICT, AMONG REGIONAL STATES AND DAMAGE TO US COMMERCIAL AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN PERSIAN GULF. A PRIORITY US GOAL THEREFORE IS STRENGTHENING OF UAE INTERNAL STABILITY AND FEDERATION'S WESTERN ORIENTATION BY GIVING VISIBLE SUPPORT TO UAE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL COHESION AND BY ENCOURAGING UAE LEADERSHIP TO MAINTAIN CLOSE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH OURSELVES AND WITH OTHER FRIENDLY GULF AND REGIONAL STATES. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP IS DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE AND ASSIST UAE TO MAINTAIN MODEST-SIZED LAND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND OF CONTRIBUTING WITH OTHER FRIENDLY STATES TO REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES. AS THE SAME TIME, WE SEEK TO AVOID--AND TO ENCOURAGE OTHERS

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TO AVOID--SALE TO UAE OR TO INDIVIDUAL EMIRATES WITHIN THE UAE OF WEAPONS AND OTHER TYPES OF EQUIPMENT WHICH BECAUSE OF THEIR QUANTITY, SOPHISTICATION, OR OFFENSIVE NATURE WOULD (A) CREATE A DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE REGION OR WITHIN THE UAE ITSELF AND (B) FURTHER TAX ALREADY SEVERELY LIMITED UAE MILITARY MANPOWER CAPABILITIES.

3. STATEMENT OF THE THREAT: RECENT REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING SEIZURE OF POWER BY RADICAL ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH YEMEN, THE CONFLICT IN HORN OF AFRICA, INSTABILITY IN NORTH YEMEN, LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, FESTERING ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, DHOFAR INSURGENCY IN NEIGHBORING OMAN, AND LINGERING BORDER DEMARCATION PROBLEMS HAVE UNDERSCORED UAE LEADERSHIP'S CONCERNS ABOUT POTENTIAL ENCIRCLEMENT BY AND PRESSURES FROM HOSTILE REGIMES. INTERNALLY, UAE LEADERS ARE CONCERNED OVER PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF FOREIGN WORKERS (FOUR-FIFTHS OF TOTAL POPULATION), INCLUDING MANY PALESTINIANS; SOCIAL DISLOCATIONS OF RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRADITIONAL ARABIAN SOCIETY; SEVERAL ISOLATED TERRORIST ACTS LINKED TO INTER-ARAB DISPUTES; AND UNRESOLVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IMPORTANT EMIRATES OVER FUTURE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

IN RESPONSE TO THESE CONCERNS FEDERAL LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO BRING DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY INDIVIDUAL EMIRATES UNDER UNIFIED FEDERAL COMMAND RESPONSIBLE TO CHIEF OF STATE. UAE SEES NEED FOR MODERN AND CREDIBLE DEFENSE FORCES TO HOLD THE UNION TOGETHER, TO PRESERVE INTERNAL SECURITY, TO DETER TERRITORIAL ENCROACHMENT BY LARGER REGIONAL NEIGHBORS, AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO ARAB LEAGUE OR REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (E.G., IN LEBANON).

4. MISSIONS'S PERCEPTION OF THREAT: NO IMMEDIATE EXTERNAL THREAT TO UAE EXISTS. TERRITORIAL ISSUES WITH UAE NEAREST NEIGHBORS HAVE EITHER BEEN RESOLVED OR ARE UNDER NEGOTIATION. SERIOUS EXTERNAL RISK TO UAE WOULD ARISE ONLY WERE OMAN, CONFIDENTIAL

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SAUDI ARABIA, OR IRAN TO FALL UNDER RADICAL DOMINATION OR ENTER INTO CONFLICT AMONG THEMSELVES. NEITHER OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS SEEMS IMMINENT. POTENTIAL THREAT TO UAE IS NOW MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY, INTERNAL RATHER THAN EXTERNAL. INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TENSIONS EXIST BUT IN OUR JUDGEMENT NEITHER THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT MODERATE UAE LEADERSHIP NOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE FEDERAL UNION PRESENTLY IS IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. ANSWER TO THESE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 ABU DHABI 2039

PROBLEMS IS NOT DEVELOPMENT OF LARGER OR MORE HEAVILY ARMED DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT BUT EARLY RESOLUTION OF EXISTING POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE EMIRATES, ENHANCED INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES, AND POLICY OF MAINTAINING CLOSE COOPERATION WITH OTHER REGIONAL MODERATES, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, IN RESISTING RADICAL ENCROACHMENTS INTO THE GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA.

5. TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UAE SEEKS. EARLIER FEARS OF TERRITORIAL ENCROACHMENTS BY LARGER NEIGHBORS AND RIVALRIES AMONG THE EMIRATES LED TO RAPID BUILDUP DURING EARLY SEVENTIES, ESPECIALLY BY ABU DHABI EMIRATE, OF SIZEABLE MILITARY FORCES, INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR UNITS. UAE NOW HAS DEFENSE FORCES TOTALLING 25-30 THOUSAND MEN, CURRENTLY BEING REORGANIZED INTO FOUR INFANTRY AND ONE ARMORED BRIGADES WITH SUPPORTING UNITS. PROMPTED IN PART BY PRESTIGE CONSIDERATIONS AND ALSO BY EXAMPLES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, UAE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN LOATH TO REDUCE THESE FORCES TO MORE EFFICIENT SIZE. MOREOVER, GIVEN SPARSE NATIVE POPULATION AND ABSENCE OF TECHNICAL SKILLS, PRESENT MILITARY STRENGTH HAS BEEN ATTAINED ONLY BY RECRUITING FOREIGN (PRIMARILY OMANI) PERSONNEL IN LOWER RANKS AND BY

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CONTRACT OR SECONDMENT OF UK, PAKISTANI AND NON-UAE ARAB OFFICERS TO SUPPLY COMMAND AND TECHNICAL DEFICIENCIES IN MIDDLE AND HIGHER RANKS. NEARLY 80 PERCENT OF UAE MILITARY ARE NOW ESTIMATED TO BE NON-NATIONALS, A SERIOUS IMBALANCE UAE IS SLOWLY ATTEMPTING TO REDRESS BY TRYING ENCOURAGE MORE UAE CITIZENS TO ENLIST. COMPULSORY CONSCRIPTION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT WILL PROBABLY PROVE INFEASIBLE TO IMPLEMENT. UAE'S YOUNG MILITARY LEADERS ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO MODERNIZE THEIR ARMED FORCES BY SENDING INCREASED NUMBER OF NATIONAL OFFICERS ABROAD FOR TRAINING AND BY PURCHASING FROM ABROAD MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY INCLUDING ARMOR, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. SIZE, DISTRIBUTION, AND COMMAND STRUCTURE OF UAE ARMED FORCES ARE HOWEVER CURRENTLY A MATTER OF INTERNAL CONTROVERSY. SHAIKH RASHID, RULER OF DUBAI AND FEDERATION VICE PRESIDENT, OPPOSES ZAYID'S RECENT MILITARY UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND DOMINANT ROLE PLAYED BY ABU DHABI MILITARY IN FEDERAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. DUBAI'S MILITARY FORCES REMAIN OUTSIDE THE PRESENT FEDERAL COMMAND STRUCTURE AND DUBAI HAS RECENTLY PURCHASED BRITISH SCORPION TANKS FOR ITS FORCES. THIS CONTROVERSY HAS DELAYED FIRM DECISIONS ON PURCHASES OF SOME MAJOR NEW MILITARY HARDWARE AND RATIONAL REORGANIZATION OF FORMER EMIRATE DEFENSE FORCES INTO STANDARD BRIGADE-SIZE UNITS.

6. US ASSESSMENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE. WE CONSIDER THAT PRESENT SIZE OF UAE ARMED FORCES IS OVER-LARGE FOR FEDERATION'S IMMEDIATE DEFENSE NEEDS. GIVEN ITS SEVERE MANPOWER PROBLEMS, UAE COULD WELL DO WITH SMALLER (PERHAPS 10-15 THOUSAND MEN) BUT BETTER TRAINED AND MORE MOBILE DEFENSE FORCE. CONTINUED US WILLINGNESS TO OFFER MILITARY TRAINING ON FMS CASH BASIS TO SMALL NUMBER OF UAE PERSONNEL EACH YEAR WOULD HELP CONTRIBUTE TO THIS GOAL. PREPARATION OF
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QUALIFIED UAE NATIONALS TO ASSUME KEY COMMAND AND TECHNICAL POSITIONS WOULD ALSO ENABLE UAE TO LESSEN ITS CURRENT OVERWHELMING DEFENDENCE UPON EXPATRIATE OFFICERS AND ENLISTED RANKS. RELIANCE UPON FOREIGN PERSONNEL HAS PROBABLY ENCOURAGED RATHER THAN DISCOURAGED EXPANSION OF UAE ARMED FORCES TO UNNECESSARY SIZE AND ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS LIKE RECENTLY PURCHASED FRENCH AMX-30 TANKS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN MOTIVATED MORE BY REASONS OF PRESTIGE-- AND PERHAPS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES -- THAN BY ANY DISCERNIBLE EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT. SOME IMPROVED AIR AND COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND VITAL ON-SHORE AND OFF-SHORE INDUSTRIAL TARGETS (E.G., OIL LOADING FACILITIES, LNG PLANTS, PORTS) WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE US INTEREST IN SAFEGUARDING ACCESS TO THESE FACILITIES IN THE EVENT OF REGIONAL OR GLOBAL CONFLICT. HOWEVER, ACQUISITION FROM WESTERN EUROPE OF RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED ARMOR AND ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS (WE TURNED DOWN LAST YEAR UAE REQUEST TO PURCHASE TOWS) IS LIKELY TO STIMULATE SIMILAR ACQUISITIONS BY NEIGHBORING STATES, THEREBY ATTENUATING OUR LOWER GULF ARMS SALES POLICY OBJECTIVE OF DISCOURAGING REGIONAL ARMS RACES.

7. DEFENSE SPENDING IN UAE ECONOMY. UAE FACES VIRTUALLY NO FINANCIAL RESTRAINT ON ITS ABILITY TO ACQUIRE MODERN WEAPONS. HOWEVER, MANPOWER CONSTRIANTS, LOW LEVELS OF EDUCATION AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND INABILITY TO MOVE ON MANY PROCUREMENT DECISIONS BECAUSE OF LACK OF STANDARDIZATION AMONG UNITS HAS LIMITED ACTUAL SPENDING ON SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY. IN 1977 MINDEF WAS ALLOCATED DH 2.565 BILLION (\$657 MILLION), OR ABOUT 19 PERCENT OF TOTAL FEDERAL BUDGET ALLOCATIONS OF DH 13,150 BILLION. ACTUAL SPENDING, HOWEVER, WAS DH 270 MILLION (\$69.5 MILLION) BELOW THAT ALLOCATION. (NOTE: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER 1977 PURCHASES BY ABU DHABI OF TANKS AND OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES WERE COVERED BY MINDEF ALLOCATION IN FEDERAL BUDGET OR WHETHER THESE FUNDS CAME DIRECTLY FROM ABU DHABI EMIRATE
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FUNDS.) IN 1978 BUDGET DEFENSE IS ALLOCATED DH 3 BILLION (\$769 MILLION) OR ABOUT 28.5 PERCENT OF TOTAL BUDGET ALLOCATIONS OF DH 10.5 BILLION. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT 1977 AND 1978 FEDERAL BUDGETS ARE NOT WHOLLY COMPARABLE AS 1977 BUDGET INCLUDED FOREIGN AID ALLOCATIONS WHICH IN 1978 WERE INCLUDED IN ABU DHABI EMIRATE BUDGET. ALSO, IT IS NOT CERTAIN IF 1978 FEDERAL BUDGET INCLUDES DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS FOR MILITARY UNITS IN DUBAI WHICH, BECAUSE OF DISPUTE OVER 1978 MILITARY REORGANIZATION, ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE FUNDED NOW ENTIRELY BY EMIRATE OF DUBAI.) THERE ARE NO RELIABLE ESTIMATES OF UAE GNP. WE GUESS GNP IN 1977 AND 1978 TO BE AROUND \$12 BILLION (PLUS OR MINUS ONE BILLION) MAKING FEDERAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ABOUT 4.9 PERCENT OF

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SECDEF WASHDC//ASD:ISA/DSAA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER//ECJ4/7

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 3 ABU DHABI 2039

GNP IN 1977 AND DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS ABOUT 6.4 PERCENT OF GNP IN 1978. NO DATA ON MILITARY IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS IS AVAILABLE BUT THEY ARE BELIVED TO BE QUITE SMALL. DEFENSE SPENDING HAS NOT CREATED ANY FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS FOR UAE, WHICH IN 1977 HAD BOP SURPLUS ESTIMATED AT \$2 BILLION,

8. PROJECTION OF US SALES OF DEFENSE ITEMS AND SERVICES. TRAINING IS ONLY ITEM UAE IS LIKELY TO ACQUIRE FROM US ON FMS CASH BASIS DURING 1978-80. FIRM FIGUES ON TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS PERIOD ARE NOT AVAILABLE BUT COULD EXCEED \$1 MILLION EACH YEAR, ESPECIALLY IF UPT PROGRAM CURRENTLY

UNDER NEGOTIATION IS IMPLEMENTED. NO MAJOR PURCHASES UNDER FMS ARE CONTEMPLATED. COMMERCIAL SALES OF TWO ADDITIONAL C-130 AIRCRAFT, M-16 RIFLES, AND AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (TYPE AND SCOPE UNKNOWN) AS WELL AS SMALL PATROL CRAFT FOR THE COAST GUARD ARE POSSIBILITIES DURING THIS PERIOD.

9. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF PROPOSED TRAINING AND OF POSSIBLE COMMERCIAL SALES MENTIONED ABOVE WOULD BE VIRTUALLY NIL. NO NEW CAPABILITIES WOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO GULF REGION, A POTENTIALITY DELIBERATELY CONFIDENTIAL

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DISCOURAGED BY OUR CURRENT RESTRICTIVE LOWER GULF ARMS SALE POLICY.

10. HUMAN RIGHTS EVALUATION. UAE HAS NOT BEEN A FOCUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERN. FULL RANGE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE NOT YET INVOLVED IN THIS STILL ESSENTIALLY TRADITIONAL ARABIAN AND MUSLIM SOCIETY. IN PARTICULAR, POLITICAL AND TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS ARE OFFICIALLY DISCOURAGED. HOWEVER, OTHER FREEDOMS INCLUDING GUARANTEES OF INDIVIDUAL AGAINST TORTURE, SUMMARY ARREST OR IMPRISONMENT, OR CRUEL AND INHUMAN (BY LOCAL STANDARDS) PUNISHMENT ARE CONTAINED IN UAE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AND APPEAR TO BE OBSERVED IN PRACTICE. THERE IS HIGH DEGREE OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, FREE HEALTH CARE, AND ACCESS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION FOR CITIZENS. NON-MUSLIM EXPATRIATE RESIDENTS ENJOY RIGHT TO PRACTICE THEIR RELIGIONS. WITH CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIALIZED POLICE FORCES SEPARATE FROM DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, LATTER HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE INVOLVED IN INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES. THERE WOULD BE LITTLE DIRECT IMPACT UPON HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN UAE FROM OUR VERY MODEST SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. AS FMS CASH SALES PROGRAM EXPECTED TO CONSIST PRIMARILY OF CONUS TRAINING, EXPOSURE OF UAE MILITARY TRAINEES TO AMERICAN SYSTEM WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS (INCLUDING WAY IN WHICH THESE ARE SUSTAINED IN UNIFORM SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE) IS BEST WAY TO HELP PROMOTE AND ADVANCE US HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES IN THIS COUNTRY.

11. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES. UAE CURRENTLY EMPLOYS SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF CONTRACT/SECONDED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL FROM UK, PAKISTAN, JORDAN, EGYPT, AND SUDAN, AMONG THESE ARE CHIEF OF STAFF (JORDAN), AIR CONFIDENTIAL

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FORCE COMMANDER (PAKISTAN) AND DEPUTY COMMANDER (EGYPT), AND NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER (EGYPT). UK AND FRENCH MILITARY ADVISORY MISSIONS ARE STATIONED IN ABU DHABI EMIRATE. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT ARE CURRENTLY PURCHASED FROM UK, FRANCE, ITALY, AND WEST GERMANY. UAE IS ALSO A CONTRIBUTOR TO CAIRO-BASED ARAB MILITARY INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND MAY IN FUTURE MEET SOME ITS EQUIPMENT NEEDS FROM THAT SOURCE. UAE MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE SENT ABROAD FOR TRAINING IN UK, FRANCE, ITALY, EGYPT, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND PAKISTAN AS WELL AS IN US.

12. COMMENTS: AS WILL BE ALREADY EVIDENT, WE HAVE VERY LITTLE CURRENT INFORMATION ABOUT UAE MILITARY EXPENDITURES, FORCE LEVEL OBJECTIVES, AND MAJOR ARMS PURCHASES PLANNED OVER THE 1978-80 PERIOD. THIS REFLECTS NOT ONLY ACCUSTOMED UAE SECRECY ABOUT DISCLOSURE OF DEFENSE MATTERS BUT ALSO CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT AND INDECISION WITHIN UAE ABOUT FUTURE ARMS PURCHASES AND FOREIGN TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. RESTRICTIVE US ARMS SALES POLICIES TOWARD UAE, THE ABSENCE OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY LIAISON BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND ESTABLISHED UAE MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAVE FURTHER LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH UAE MILITARY PLANNERS ON MATTERS COVERED BY THIS ASSESSMENT. WE RECOGNIZE THEREFORE THAT OUR RESPONSES TO MANY OF QUESTIONS POSED BY NEW SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS WILL FALL SHORT OF DEGREE OF DETAIL DESIRED BY WASHINGTON END-USERS OF THIS REPORT. WHILE EMBASSY OFFICERS WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THEIR ACCESS TO AND ANALYSIS OF DESIRED INFORMATION, WE CANNOT BE SANQUINE-- GIVEN LEVEL AND NON-SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES OF PERSONNEL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO US--THAT FUTURE REPORTS IN THIS SERIES WILL NECESSARILY PRODUCE FIRMER OR MORE DETAILED ESTIMATES OF UAE SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS.
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